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Citizenship by investment (CBI) programs have recently garnered significant academic 
and media attention. Turkey introduced such a program in 2017 that offers citizenship in 
exchange for investment in residential property. Eventually, thousands of foreigners, 
mainly from the Middle East and Asia have purchased houses, particularly in Istanbul. 
Foreigners’ share in total houses sold in Istanbul almost sextupled and exceeded 10  
percent of total sales. This study estimates the short-run impact of relatively wealthy 
foreigners on the residential property prices in Istanbul to buy a Turkish passport. It finds 
that the Turkish CBI program positively impacts house prices by two percent in the 
districts, which are likely to be favored most by immigrant investors. 
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Buying citizenship: A boon to district-level house prices in Istanbul 
1. Introduction 
There is a proliferation of investment-based migration programs in recent years (Gamlen et al., 
2019; Surak, 2020; Dzankic, 2019). Several countries across the globe try to attract investment 
by granting investors either residence or citizenship rights. These are featured in advertorials as 
“golden visa” and “golden passport” options. The former is a more common practice adopted 
by countries worldwide such as the USA, the UK, Canada, Belgium, Australia, Portugal, and 
Singapore.1. The latter is relatively new and includes both discretionary acquisitions of 
citizenship on the grounds of national economic interest and detailed citizenship by investment 
(CBI) programs (Dzankic 2018, 2019). Economic difficulties after the European debt crisis 
have led several European countries to launch either economic residency programs as in 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Ireland or citizenship by investment (CBI) programs as in the case 
of Malta and Cyprus (See, among others, Parker, 2016; Ampudia de Haro and Gaspar, 2019; 
Xu et.al. 2015). 
This year marks the 37th anniversary of CBI programs. In simple terms, they refer to a direct 
exchange between a financial disbursement in the form of capital investment or property 
purchase and citizenship status. Several islands in the Caribbean Sea, including St. Kitts and 
Nevis and the Commonwealth of Dominica, have long-running CBI programs. In Europe, for 
example, Austria has the practice of granting citizenship to investors since 1985, but its 
regulation is less detailed than in the Caribbean islands, and it is more reliant on the 
discretionary power of the state authority. More recently, several CBI schemes have been 
introduced in small Caribbean countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, and St. Lucia 
and in relatively large emerging countries such as Turkey (see Table 1). According to the 
Citizenship by Investment index (https://cbiindex.com/reports/) published by The Financial 
Times’ Professional Wealth Management (PWM) magazine, fourteen countries offer their 
passports for sale to the wealthy as of 2020. There is an increase in the number of countries 
offering CBI schemes together with a substantial increase in their applicants (Dzankic, 2019). 
The global market for CBI programs is estimated to be around USD 25bn a year (Treanor and 
Nunis, 2019).  
 
 




[Table 1 near here] 
The CBI programs have an economic rationale. Cross-border capital flows into host countries 
can be substantial for small countries. For example, St. Kitts and Nevis witnessed significant 
inflows to its public sector alone, reaching nearly 25 percent of GDP in 2013 (Xu et al., 2015). 
In addition to such direct effects, these programs can also lead to positive spillover effects in 
some sectors depending on the design and magnitude of the program. Lately, CBI schemes are 
very popular with real estate options where investment in residential houses is offered to acquire 
citizenship. Foreign investment in real estate is expected to increase real estate prices. It is 
reported that it led to a boom in the construction sector in St. Kitts and Nevis in 2015 and 
boosted the price of luxury real estate in Portugal in 2012 (Xu et al., 2015). Leaving aside the 
extant literature on the impact of migration on house prices, there is, however, a shortage of 
empirical studies directly examining the relationship between the CBI programs and real estate 
prices. As a latecomer to the CBI club, Turkey offers a unique environment to investigate the 
impact of CBI schemes on local house prices. Its program particularly encourages investment 
in the property market. It does not require any other contribution to the government in some 
form of a registration fee or any additional non-refundable contribution to any government fund.  
Turkey launched its CBI program in January 2017. In due course, it has witnessed a dramatic 
increase in house sales to foreigners and received a lot of public attention through extensive 
media coverage. Therefore, we aim to investigate the impact of this program on the residential 
house prices in Istanbul, where more than half of total house sales to foreigners have 
materialized during that period. We compare local house price movements in the short window 
immediately preceding and following the implementation of the CBI program in January 2017. 
We compare the effect of this program on the house prices in the districts of Istanbul with high 
immigrant concentration to the low immigrant concentration over the same period.  
We base our assumption of destination choice of new immigrants on the concept of social 
networks according to which immigrants tend to live in districts with a large share of 
immigrants with a similar background or a shared ethnicity2. Card (2001) applied this 
assumption in the migration literature. It implies that the destination choice of current 
immigrants within the country is highly correlated with the number of compatriots already 
established in that specific destination (i.e., city, province, or region). We demonstrate that the 
 
2 One may see some of the related works of the authors as follows in the references: Aysan 2021, Aysan & Disli 
& Ozturk 2014, Aysan & Disli & Nagayev & Rizkiah & Salim 2021, Aysan & Ertek & Ozturk 2008, Aysan & 




destination choice of current immigrants in Istanbul due to the Turkish CBI program has 
eventually contributed to an upsurge in house prices in several districts where the share of 
foreign-born Istanbul residents (i.e., immigrants) is relatively high. That is, we show that local 
house prices rise disproportionally more in districts with a higher foreign population density 
(more than five percent) after the implementation of the CBI program. We find that it had a 
positive impact on the house prices by two percent in the districts which are likely to be favored 
most by immigrant investors.  
Our paper contributes to the extensive literature on the economic effects of immigration in three 
specific ways. First, there is less work directed toward understanding the effects of relatively 
better-off immigrants on housing markets. It should be noted that Turkey is not one of the top 
destinations for high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) from developing countries. Therefore, 
relatively better-off or wealthy immigrants mentioned in this paper do not correspond to 
HNWIs. They instead designate persons whose investible wealth exceeds 250K US dollars. 
How wealthy foreigners (immigrants) affect local housing markets is an empirical question. It 
can directly increase the demand for housing, leading to an increase in local house prices. 
However, the preferences of domestic residents can offset the direct effects of wealthy 
foreigners. If residents would like to avoid cultural diversity, then ‘native outflows’ can offset 
the upward price pressure. Empirical evidence concerning the overall relationship between 
immigration and property prices is so far mixed. Some studies predict that immigration 
increases house prices because of an increase in demand for accommodation (Gonzalez and 
Ortega, 2013; Saiz, 2003 and 2007), while some others argue the opposite due to a decline in 
perceived desirability of new neighbors (Sa, 2015) or differences in housing tenure and usage 
of housing space between natives and immigrants (Braakmann, 2016). In a comprehensive 
meta-regression analysis, Larkin et al. (2019) find that immigration leads to an increase in house 
prices on average, but that effect is more limited in countries where locals are less hospitable 
to immigrants.  
Our study is partly related to this strand of the literature but focuses on the impact of the CBI 
program on residential property prices per se. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical paper examining the short-run impact of the CBI programs on the housing market. 
Second, most of the existing literature understandably focuses on the advanced countries as 
cited above due to the massive influx of immigrants. In emerging countries, there are arguably 
only a few papers studying the role of immigration on housing markets despite the increase in 




investigating the impact of refugees, but not that of immigrants or foreigners. For example, 
Balkan et al. (2018) and Tumen (2016) show that Syrian refugee inflows have generated an 
increase in the rents of higher-quality housing units in the neighboring cities in the southeastern 
part of Turkey. They argue that these lend support to the residential segregation story in the 
Turkish case. Our paper is undoubtedly different from them regarding motivation, driving force, 
location, and unit of analysis. Finally, our work contributes to the burgeoning literature on the 
determinants of real estate prices in Turkey. Most of the previous studies such as Yener et.al. 
(2020) and Tunc (2020) employ house price data at the countrywide level or province-level at 
best and emphasize the role of macroeconomic indicators such as capital inflows, interest rates, 
and disposable income or some regional dynamics such as population density, unemployment, 
climate, and education. Our study utilizes the district-level data, points to the role of the Turkish 
CBI program and the inflow of relatively wealthy foreigners as another determinant of house 
prices, at least in some specific districts of Istanbul. Last but not least, from a political economy 
perspective, the current CBI program can be considered not merely as another example of the 
commodification of citizenship but more of an extension of the financialization of housing 
where the state itself effectively continues to expand the scale and scope of the housing-finance 
nexus.3 The design of the Turkish CBI program lends support to the understanding that the 
Turkish government places the utmost importance on the development of the construction 
industry and takes an active role to back it in times of economic slowdown.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the context of Istanbul and citizenship 
by investment program. Then, methodology and data are explained in the following two 
sections. In section 5, empirical results are presented and discussed with implications. Finally, 
the last section concludes.  
2. The context of Istanbul and citizenship by investment program 
For a long time, Turks have considered Istanbul a city where its land and stone are made of 
gold. Decades-long internal migration has played a role in establishing this convention among 
the inhabitants. Only in 2016, the number of out-migrants exceeded those of in-migrants in 
Istanbul, but the trend reversed in 2019 partly due to a rise in its foreign-born residents.4 
 
3 See Erguven (2020) and Yesilbag (2020) for an extensive analysis of the financialization of housing in Turkey 
and Serin et al. (2020) for the role of the state acting as a regulatory mechanism, a land developer, and a house 
builder in the commodification of urban space in Istanbul. Also, see Mavelli (2018) for a discussion of the 
relationship between citizenship by investment and neoliberal political economy. 
4 According to an address-based registration system published by the Turkish Statistical Institute, the number of 





Property investment in Istanbul has received increasing attention from foreign investors lately. 
The year 2019 was a record year in terms of total houses sold to foreigners in Turkey and 
Istanbul when house sale figures reached 45,483 and 20,857 respectively, up from 18,189 sales 
and 5,811 sales in 2016. More importantly, foreigners were responsible for almost 10 out of 
100 house sales in Istanbul in 2019, which was 3 out of 100 houses in 2016 and 2017 (Figure 
1) The strong growth in property sales to foreign buyers in recent years was not only due to 
robust tourism but more due to the introduction of the CBI program  
 [Figure 1 near here] 
The Turkish property market has been open to foreign buyers since 2002 (Polat, 2019). 
However, only nationals of countries like Britain and Germany that allow Turkish citizens 
reciprocal rights were allowed to purchase properties in a few zones. These zones were 
abolished in 2005, and the reciprocity condition ended in 2012.5 Since then, thousands of 
foreigners from Russia to GCC countries, which were previously banned, have successfully 
acquired properties in Turkey, most notably in Istanbul, in the Mediterranean resort city of 
Antalya, and the industrial city of Bursa. Foreigners could now buy up to 30 hectares of property 
(up from 2.5 hectares) without special permission. On the other hand, a significant policy 
change occurred when Turkey introduced its CBI scheme in January 2017 after July 15, 2016 
coup attempt, which sent a shockwave throughout the economy. Among the several options in 
the scheme, purchasing property was particularly attractive to get a Turkish passport, which 
required a minimum amount of USD 1 million investment.  This amount was reduced due to 
financial woes starting in August 2018. New regulations were introduced in September 2018 
and granted citizenship to foreigners in exchange for  
i) purchasing real estate worth at least US$ 250,000, down from US$ 1 million;  
ii) or putting US$ 500,000 into a fixed capital investment;  
iii) or keeping at least US$ 500,000 in a Turkish bank account for a minimum of three years, 
down from the earlier cap of US$ 3 million;  
 
increase in in-migration was 15.2 percent, which implies a significant contribution. The number of abroad-born 
residents in Istanbul has reached 16, 653 people in 2019 up from 4,166 in 2017. It represents almost 14 percent of 
net migration and 3.4 percent of net migration and in-migration of Istanbul respectively in 2019. The share of 
abroad-born residents in Istanbul was less than 1 percent of total in-migration in 2017.  
5 Under article 35 of the Land Registry Law No. 2644, amended by Law No. 6302, Turkey allowed citizens of 183 





iv) or generating 50 jobs, down from 100 jobs. 6   
This scheme was widely seen as a bid to stimulate the slumping real estate market. It arrived 
after the Turkish Lira had already plummeted more than forty percent against the US dollar in 
August 2018 and economic activity in the real estate and construction industry continued to 
decline.7 Later in December 2018, the Turkish government put another amendment that allows 
foreigners to apply for Turkish citizenship by purchasing real estates from unfinished or off-
plan projects.8 These rules have led to a real estate route in Turkey as one of the low-cost CBI 
programs, of which the immediate impact on the housing market was widely covered and 
commented on by the press.9 According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, the number of houses 
sold to foreigners more than doubled, reaching 4,200 homes per month after September 2018. 
It reached an all-time high with 6,327 monthly sales in October 2018. The number of houses 
sold was about 41,151 units between January 2017 and August 2018, while it reached 67,288 
homes between September 2018 and December 2019. Most of the foreign buyers are Turkey’s 
neighboring countries. Iraqis, Iranians, and Saudis were the biggest buyers of Turkish property. 
According to 2019 cumulative statistics, Arab countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Jordan, Yemen, Palestine, Libya, Egypt, Qatar, and Lebanon, constitute 42 percent of total 
foreign buyers. Iranians follow them with a 12 percent share. Nationals of advanced countries, 
including Germany, the UK, Sweden, and the US, have 10 percent. The rest of the countries are 
Russia (5 percent), Afghanistan (5 percent), and Azerbaijan (3 percent).  
There is limited information regarding the overall number and breakdown of foreigners 
acquiring citizenship due to their investment in Turkey. Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that 
overall more than 9000 foreign investors have benefited from the Turkish CBI program and 
invested in around USD 2.8 billion within three years, and the overwhelming majority of the 
 
6 See the Presidential Decree No. 106 published in the Official Gazette dated September 19, 2018 
7 By the end of the last quarter of 2018, the Turkish economy went into recession. See also real estate sector reports 
in Turkey available at  https://www.gyoder.org.tr/uploads/gyoder_gosterge/GOSTERGE-CEYREK1-2019-ING-
_1_.pdf [Accessed 30 September 2020]. 
8 See the Presidential Decree No. 418 in the Official Gazette dated December 7, 2018 
9 See, for example, “Turkish passport demand soars as rules relaxed”, The Financial Times, Jan 27, 2019; Foreign 
Buyers Flood Turkey’s Struggling Housing Market, Mansion Global, January 2019; Turkish property sales to 
foreigners keep up with strong performance, post all-time high in 5 months of 2019, Daily Sabah, Jun 17, 2019;  
“Property sales to foreigners hit record levels in Turkey”, TRTWorld, Apr 18, 2019; Passport demand soars after 
Turkey slashes cost, Ahval News, Jan 28, 2019."Iranian home buyers dodge sanctions, make Turkey their plan B, 
Reuters, October 1, 2019, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-iranians-idUSKBN1WG3ON; 
"Saudis snap up homes in Turkey as top foreign buyers", The Times, 29 August 2019; "House Hunting in … 




investment has been realized in 2019.10 Accordingly, Iranians occupy the top spot and have a 
share of 26 percent in the total number of citizenships granted. Nationals of Arab countries - 
those of Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, Jordan, Libya, and Egypt - represent 48 percent of the total 
citizenships granted. Other significant countries are Afghanistan, with a share of 15 percent, 
China, with a share of 8 percent, and Pakistan (3 percent).11 Anecdotal evidence from the field, 
written press, and social media also suggest that Iranians, Arab nationals, and Afghan people 
are interested in investing in the Istanbul property market and receiving citizenship in due 
course.12 Relatively wealthy nationals of Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Libya, and Afghanistan reasonably 
would prefer to invest in the property market to get a Turkish passport. These countries suffer 
a lot from recent political and economic uncertainties in their homelands. Correspondingly, 
Badarinza and Ramadorai (2018) emphasize the role of foreigners facing political risk in their 
home countries and foreign demand as an important determinant of London house prices. 
Indeed, several foreign investors designate Turkey as a haven, an open society, and a more 
Europeanized country. Besides, a Turkish passport allows them to travel more freely across the 
globe with more visa-free travel options than their home countries’ passports (Wither and 
Erkoyun, 2019).  
2.1.Migrant networks and segregation in Istanbul   
Turkey has been experiencing an influx of foreigners for a long time as a country of transit to 
the European Union for irregular migrants and a country of refugees for asylum seekers. More 
recently, it has also become a country of immigration as a result of intense migratory 
movements over the last three decades (among others, see İçduygu and Kirişci, 2009; Kirişci, 
2007). In particular, Istanbul has become a top destination for movers from the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia through migrant networks. Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties 
connecting movers, former movers, and non-movers in countries of origin and Istanbul through 
social connections, which are primarily based on kinship and friendship.  
 
10 https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/yabanci-yatirimcidan-2-milyar-771-milyon-250-bin-dolarlik-katki/1748243 
retrieved as of November 30, 2020. From a comparative perspective, Turkey’s figures seem satisfactory, as well. 
For example, Portugal conceded 6,687 golden visas between 2012 and 2018 (Gaspar and de Haro, 2019). Malta 
has received 1742 applications since the inception of the individual investor program as of 30 June 2019.  
Available at https://oriip.gov.mt/en/Documents/Reports/Annual%20Report%202019.pdf. [Accessed 30 
November 2020]. See also Surak (2020) to compare the number of applications with the EU member countries.  
11 (http://www.yourkeyturkey.gov.tr/citizen ship-statistics). 
12 One can also examine Google Trends to get an understanding of how the Turkish CBI program has become 
popular over time. It shows that there is a worldwide increase in the search interest for the terms “Citizenship by 
Investment Turkey” or “Turkey passport” after the policy change in September 2018. Investors from the Arab 
countries, Iran, and Pakistan have shown greater interest after the policy change which was probably materialized 




After continuous waves of immigration to Istanbul starting from the 1980s, it is very likely to 
observe a “cumulative causation” whereby multiple ties to communities or origin facilitate 
ongoing and at times increasing migration (Massey et al., 1993; Massey, 1994; Wilson, 1994). 
For instance, İçduygu and Karadağ (2018) and Kaya (2017) show how new migrants and 
refugees join the old settlers in particular locations and tend to live in Istanbul, primarily by 
coming through their networks of relatives and friends. As observed in several countries, 
foreigners, particularly those with the same community, ethnicity, and culture, prefer to live 
together in the same neighborhood or district. Indeed, some of the districts of Istanbul are 
associated with the spatial concentration of particular migrant networks. Some of the prominent 
ones are the Syrian community in Zeytinburnu, Küçükçekmece, Fatih, Bağcılar and Sultanbeyli 
districts, Iraqi community in Fatih and Esenyurt districts, Afghan community in Zeytinburnu 
and Beykoz districts, Chinese nationals from Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China in 
Zeytinburnu, Kucukcekmece and Silivri districts, and Syrian Turkmens in Esenler district.13  
Subsequently, an obvious outcome of such a spatial concentration is the segregation from the 
broader local population, which refers to the segregated geographies of neighborhoods or 
districts reflecting a history of immigration, internal migration, class, and intergroup ethnic and 
racial relations, and conflict (Newbold, 2021). Parallel to the findings of the related literature, 
Istanbul broadly seems to display two different patterns of residential segregation (Zelinsky and 
Lee, 1998; Allen and Turner, 1996; Price and Singer, 2008; İçduygu and Millet, 2016). On the 
one hand, most immigrants continue to settle in traditional and segregated enclaves in the inner 
city that offer less expensive housing, public transportation, and access to employment, such as 
Fatih and Zeytinburnu districts. On the other hand, new arrival groups bypass traditional inner-
city enclaves to settle in more dispersed and new suburban areas such as Basaksehir and 
Esenyurt, reflecting different housing opportunities. In the latter case, more often, both poor 
and wealthier immigrants coexist in the same district, albeit in separate quarters reflecting their 
distinct level of economic characteristics. As most of them belong to the same ethnicity (i.e., 
Arab), it is easier to make friendship with co-ethnics. As known very well, immigrants are more 
likely to have strong ties to co-ethnics and family members in the host country (Fietz and 
Kaschowitz, 2019;  Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2013). Moreover, immigrants can talk to each other 
in their mother tongue and maintain familiar habits in a different culture, which keep them well-
grounded (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2006). In fact, in Istanbul, a common language seems to be 
more relevant than the common country in determining the geographical boundary of immigrant 
 




enclaves. It is an essential factor that separates immigrants from Turkish citizens, as well (Kaya, 
2017). 14 
3. Methodology  
We employ the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to identify house price variation in 
the districts of Istanbul before and after the implementation of the CBI program, which we treat 
as an exogenous shock. In a similar fashion to Badarinza and Ramadorai (2018), we conjecture 
that districts of Istanbul with relatively high pre-existing shares of foreign-born residents are 
preferred habitats for foreign property purchases. Moreover, Bailey et al. (2020) show that 
social connectedness is a strong predictor for migration. Theoretically, homophily is known to 
be an important explanatory factor for the configuration of personal networks (McPherson et 
al., 2001). For example, leaving aside numerous cases in developed countries, Kim et al. (2015) 
show that the location of foreign-owned houses is linked to the geography of ethnic clusters in 
Seoul, Korea. The assumption that new immigrants tend to locate in areas with a large share of 
immigrants of the same origin or ethnicity is well known in the literature and mentioned above. 
If this conjecture were right, we would expect to see relatively higher house prices in these 
specific districts of Istanbul than other districts after the implementation of the CBI program. 
Accordingly, we define our control group as the districts where the proportion of the foreign 
population (i.e., immigrants) is low, and our treatment group as the districts where the 
proportion of the foreign population is relatively higher. In other words, our empirical strategy 
relies on comparing house prices that are subject to larger compatriot inflows with those that 
are not, before and after January 2017. More specifically, the pre-treatment period includes the 
period between 2014m1 and 2016m12, while the post-treatment period spans from 2017m1 to 
2019m11. We ignore the recent dates due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Tumen 
(2016) and Altindag et.al. (2020) have also adopted DiD approach in their analysis of the 
economic impact of Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
To segregate the so-called immigrant and non-immigrant districts, in the relative sense, we sort 
the districts in terms of the share of the foreign population in the district population. Then, we 
assume that the first five districts with the highest foreign ratio make up a group. Afterward, 
we run a mean equality test between this group and the next district with the next share of the 
foreign population. If the mean does not statistically differ from this group, we add it to the 
 
14 There is certainly room for development and future research to better understand the nature of wealthy 
immigrants in Istanbul within the context of social/ethnic networks both at the conceptual and empirical level. 
Particularly an empirical study can contribute to a better understanding of motives for Turkish citizenship by 




group and proceed to test the next group. We stop when we find a district with a statistically 
significantly different (smaller) share of the immigrant population. While the former constitutes 
our treatment, the latter becomes the control group of districts.  
Given the short period, we also conjecture that the supply of housing is inelastic. The existing 
literature essentially confirms the expectation that the supply curve is inelastic in the short-run 
and elastic in the long-run (Harter-Dreiman, 2004). In other words, even in the case of an 
increase in demand for housing, the supply of housing will not immediately respond, as the 
construction of new houses will take time. More importantly, in an environment where the 
housing market is already struggling, entrepreneurs will not be eager to build more homes. As 
it takes time to build new houses, the housing supply is constant in the short run. Turkish 
Statistical Institute does not publish construction permits at the district level but Istanbul’s 
aggregate data shows that average construction permits are even lower in the post-policy period, 
most likely due to worsening economic conditions. 
Finally, we estimate the following difference-in-differences model 
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where ℎ% represents real house prices in a certain district indexed by r. The year and month are 
indexed by / and	1, respectively. The program’s impact on house prices is given by 
variable	*+*, which is defined as the multiplication of a dummy variable, which takes on a 
value of one for the post-treatment period, and another dummy for districts, which are classified 
as the treatment districts. ,' where 2 = 3, /,1 are the fixed effects for the district, year, and 
month. In our models, we try both 'combined' time effects where year and month are assumed 
one period as well as 'decoupled' time effects. We estimate all models with clustering standard 
errors. - represents a set of other macroeconomic explanatory variables such as the real 
mortgage interest rates and real effective exchange rate of the Turkish Lira. These variables are 
common to all regions. Another variable that could potentially enter - is inflation. However, 
since all of our independent and dependent variables are real, i.e., already adjusted for inflation, 
we do not include it among the covariates. If - is not included among the explanatory variables, 
we have a simple DiD model. This is reported in the paper. Although not reported in the paper, 





Our dataset includes house prices at the district level in Istanbul and covers the period between 
2014m1 and 2019m11, which we obtained from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT). As the ownership details of the properties are mostly opaque and local registry data 
are not circulated, we are condemned to rely on time series data. Istanbul has 39 districts, out 
of which only 34 districts have house price data.  The banks in Turkey extend individual housing 
loans based on the valuation reports prepared by real estate appraisal companies.  The CBRT 
compiles the price data from these valuation reports at the time of approval of housing loans. 
The actual sale or utilization of the housing loan is not required, but all appraised residential 
properties are included in the scope of the data. These prices are then used as a proxy for each 
district’s house prices after adjusted for quality changes related to housing characteristics. Our 
data are the monthly median price (in Turkish Lira) per square meter of these residential 
properties.15    
We generate real mortgage interest rates by subtracting CPI inflation for Istanbul from the 
nominal mortgage interest rates. The CPI-based real effective exchange rates are directly 
obtained from the Central Bank (CBRT). All data are monthly for the period of 2014m1 and 
2019m11. 
There are two sources of information concerning the share of the foreign population in the 
districts to identify treatment and control groups. Turkish Statistical Institute publishes foreign-
born population annually starting from 2014 at the district level based on the address-
based census. It does not provide the nationality of those classified as foreign-born. Syrian 
refugees are normally not included in that registry because they are under temporary protection. 
We suspect that Syrian refugees make up for the majority of foreign-born residents who 
migrated to Istanbul after 2014.  
The United Nations Migration Agency (International Organization for Migration - IOM) also 
publishes analysis reports based on the fieldwork in which the actual number of nationalities of 
the foreign population is provided at the district level in Istanbul.  Therefore, there is a 
discrepancy in the number of the foreign population between the official and the fieldwork 
 






statistics because the fieldwork data include Syrian refugees and other unregistered foreigners.16 
The figures with the refugees and those without, however, correlate with each other closely. In 
other words, the foreigners (migrants and immigrants) and Syrian refugees seem to prefer living 
in the same districts, most likely due to sharing the same ethnicity, language, or other socio-
cultural characteristics as mentioned above. 17  United Nations reports reveal that foreigners are 
primarily from Arab countries, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, China, Pakistan, 
Azerbaijan, and Russian Federation. Consequently, we rely on the actual data from the 
fieldwork study in 2017 to utilize the share of the foreign population in each district. 
Irrespective of whether or not we include Syrian refugees in foreign population figures, 
members of the treatment and control groups do not change substantially.  
[Figure 2 near here] 
Figure 2 presents a visual display of our treatment and control groups based on the ratio of all 
foreigners to the local population in each district.  Our treatment group consists of 17 districts, 
which are the districts with foreigners’ concentration of more than 5 percent. These districts are 
Arnavutkoy, Avcılar, Bagcılar, Bahcelievler, Basaksehir, Bayrampasa, Beyoglu, Esenler, 
Esenyurt, Eyup, Fatih, Gaziosmanpasa, Gungoren, Kagithane, Kucukcekmece, Sultangazi, and 
Zeytinburnu. The control group of districts has a much lower ratio of foreigners to population, 
mostly less than two to three percent in many cases.  
 
5. Results and Discussions  
As outlined above, we treat the introduction of the CBI program in January 2017 as an 
exogenous shock and expect an increase in house prices due to a rise in the arrival of wealthy 
foreigners. As in Bertoli et al. (2019), we reason that the foreigners who would like to become 
Turkish citizens choose the destination with relatively a higher foreign population density of 
which most have similar origin or ethnicity. We present our results in Table 2. Model 1 in 
 
16 This is expected as there are too many unregistered foreigners. IOM’s statistics depend on the information 
collected from local authorities in each neighborhood (namely from Mukhtars) and are expected to be accurate 
and timely.   
17 Syrian refugees in Turkey are not a party to the Turkish CBI program. The majority of the Syrian refugees are 
poor. However, they have an influential social network in the Arab world. Part of those residing in Istanbul is 
relatively well-educated and successful entrepreneurs. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Turkish 







Column 1 in the table displays a simple DiD model without any covariates, whereas the two 
other models in Columns 2 and 3 present DiD models with covariates. In addition, all models 
employ clustered standard errors. As a precursor to the DiD estimation, we test the so-called 
parallel trend assumption and find the coefficient on an interaction term between a time trend 
and DiD coefficient insignificant.18 The Adjusted R2 from the simple DiD model (Column 1) 
and the DiD model with covariates and decoupled time effects (Column 3) have about 98  
percent explanatory power. However, the DiD model with covariates and combined time effects 
(Column 2) has a meager one percent explanatory power. Overall, our results from Table 2 
show that the coefficient on DiD, which is the differences in house price across the treatment 
and control group, is statistically significant under different setups. In other words, the house 
prices in the treatment districts rise more than house prices in the control districts after the CBI 
program. The magnitude of this increase is about two percent, irrespective of the model 
specification.  
Foreigners' share in total houses sold in Istanbul almost sextupled and exceeded 12 percent of 
total sales after introducing the CBI program. Assuming that most foreigners would have 
purchased homes in the treatment districts, its volume looks high. Besides, an increase in the 
number of Syrian refugees in the treatment districts would likely cause higher rent prices, hence 
house prices. Moreover, anecdotal evidence from the field shows that particular foreign 
investors avoid registering their ownership. Instead, they ask their naturalized Turkish 
relatives/friends to have ownership of the property. For instance, these people are said to be 
Chinese nationals from the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, and they keep their 
identity secret due to security reasons. These issues are hard to incorporate into the model, but 
they imply unregistered or unrecorded purchases by foreigners. Finally, a two percent 
difference in house prices seems a reasonable estimate and similar to those in some other 
countries. For instance, using a DiD approach, Pavlov and Sommerville (2020) recently found 
that unexpected suspension of the investor immigration program in Canada negatively impacted 
house prices of 1.7–2.6% in the neighborhoods and market segments favored by the investor 
immigrants. 
Additionally, as obtained via Models 2 and 3, the real effective exchange rate coefficient is 
positive but only significant in Model 3. This suggests that an increase in the foreign exchange 
rate, which is the depreciation of the Turkish currency, would indirectly make a particular house 
 




cheaper, especially for foreigners. That would increase demand for houses, thus, increase house 
prices, ceteris paribus. However, the impact of the real effective exchange rate on real house 
prices is negligible. Numerically speaking, for every one-unit increase in the value of the 
foreign exchange, the house prices increase by about 0.31%. Although the negative coefficient 
on the real mortgage interest rates in Models 2 and 3 would be as expected, it is statistically 
insignificant in both models.  
 
[Table 2. near here] 
Our findings align with those of Gonzalez and Ortega (2013); Saiz (2003 and 2007); Degen and 
Fischer (2017); and Larkin et al. (2019), as opposed to Sa (2015) and Braakmann (2016) where 
the former group of authors also find a rise in house prices because of an increase in the 
immigration inflow. The likely counter impact of domestic residents’ preferences to avoid 
living in the same districts, if they exist in the context of Istanbul, do not offset the 
aforementioned positive impact. It should be noted that average house prices in the control 
districts are higher than that of treatment districts in pre and after the CBI program. However, 
there is undoubtedly a need to investigate this issue further at the neighborhood level when 
microdata is available. The district-level data cannot easily reveal residents' preferences. For 
example, in a different context using micro-level data, Balkan et al. (2018) find that the massive 
influx of Syrian refugees in the southeastern part of Turkey has led to increased rents of higher 
quality housing units in the regions where residents live. Alternatively, wealthy foreigners 
appear to attenuate the adverse effects of immigrant volumes on house price levels. Their effects 
are similar to those resulting from foreign direct investment in residential real estate. 
Consequently, a sudden increase in foreigners’ influx initiates a positive housing demand shock, 
especially in the districts of Istanbul with a higher density of foreign population. This is in line 
with the recent literature such as Kim et al. (2015) and Jun et al. (2013), which shows how the 
location of foreign-owned houses is linked to the geography of ethnic clusters in the case of 
Seoul, Korea.  
Inevitably, one should need to take a degree of caution in interpreting overall results. First, what 
percentage of the foreign population constitutes a treatment district is an important issue. For 
this purpose, we also employed median as another cut-off level for foreign population 
concentration to determine the treatment districts.  Additionally, we examined the sensitivity of 




born population, a year before the influx of Syrian refugees to Istanbul. To a large degree, the 
results are supportive of the significant impact of the CBI program on residential property 
prices. One can further argue that the policy change in the Turkish CBI program seems to 
contribute to some relaxation in the official treatment against foreigners. This is why Istanbul 
now hosts thousands of unregistered migrants, and their increasing numbers contribute to 
housing demand. Secondly, due to privacy and lack of micro-level data, it is challenging to 
identify the houses that foreign investors have purchased to acquire citizenship and compare 
their prices before and after the CBI program. It is, however, not unique to this study. In addition 
to the cautious and credible determination of treatment districts, wealthy foreigners mostly from 
Arab countries and Iran prefer to live in relatively high-quality apartments but with a shared 
culture and similar ethnicity in the same districts or neighborhoods lend support to our 
approach. Moreover, it should also be kept in mind that foreigners might not purchase real 
estate only for the sake of acquiring a Turkish passport. Foreigners from the Gulf countries and 
developed countries seem to belong to this group of investors.  
Besides, Syrian refugees in Turkey are relatively poor. There seem to be two issues 
regarding Syrians in Istanbul. Most Syrian residents in Istanbul are from Aleppo, and Aleppo's 
entrepreneurs are known to have had strong social and commercial networks with their 
counterparts in Istanbul and Iraq dating back to the period of the Ottoman Empire. Put it simply, 
not all Syrians in Istanbul are poor, and at least a small part of them run their businesses 
successfully. In addition, those relatively wealthier and well-educated have already acquired 
Turkish citizenship. As a result, some Syrian refugees have easily settled in the districts where 
wealthy foreigners such as those from Iraq also live. Secondly, a common language seems to 
be more relevant than the same country or similar socio-economic background in determining 
the geographical boundaries of immigrant enclaves. That is one of the reasons why poor Syrians 
can settle in the same districts but in separate neighborhoods known to have bad housing 
conditions. As in other big metropolises, one can observe a good neighborhood near a worse 
one, both in the same district in Istanbul. The UN statistics from the field support our contention 
(please see, the United Nations Migration Agency situation and migration report. Available at 
https://migration.iom.int). 
6. Conclusion 
Citizenship by investment programs has recently garnered significant academic and media 
attention. Turkey introduced such a program in 2017 that offers citizenship in exchange for 




foreigners to apply for Turkish citizenship by purchasing real estate. Eventually, thousands of 
foreigners, particularly from the Middle East and Asia have bought houses in Istanbul. 
Foreigners’ share in total houses sold in Istanbul almost sextupled and exceeded 10  percent of 
total sales. 
 
In this paper, we show that the influx of foreigners after the introduction of the CBI program 
has eventually contributed to an upsurge in house prices of the districts of Istanbul in which the 
share of foreigners is relatively high. More specifically, local house prices rise disproportionally 
more in districts with a higher foreign population density (more than five percent) after the 
Turkish CBI program started. It has a positive impact on the house prices by two percent in the 
districts, which are likely to be favored most by investor immigrants. This finding is in contrast 
to previous results on immigration and real estate prices. It suggests that if immigrants are many 
and relatively better off, they can raise the house prices in the districts they choose to settle. 
 
Our study has two broad policy implications. First, countries can attract more immigrants if 
they decrease the cost of immigrant investor programs -and vice versa. Second, if the CBI 
program mainly works through the real estate route, as in the case of Turkey, it can lead to 
changes in the house prices in particular locations. In that case, the economic benefits of the 
CBI may not accrue to the whole country or economy but some specific areas or sectors of the 
economy. One alternative would be to modify the design of the CBI programs so that it can 
help spread the inflows to other economic sectors and locations without generating excessive 
pressures in the construction and real estate sectors.   
 
We acknowledge some limitations to this study. We were able to obtain data on house prices at 
the district level, but not at the individual house level or the foreign investor level. It is very 
challenging to get both monthly and local data, particularly in emerging markets. As such, our 
model essentially includes macro variables. There are undoubtedly several local demand/supply 
variables, including location-specific factors, that drive house prices. They vary from the local 
market conditions in a particular location to the quality of life and the amount of housing stock 
in that specific location. However, given the span of data, wild swings in the behavior of the 
market participants would be highly unlikely based on these variables. Furthermore, 
considering the worsening economic climate in Turkey at the time of the CBI program, we do 
not think that local demand/supply variables would respond quickly and differently to reduce 




On the other hand, Turkey certainly needs a high level of transparency regarding its CBI 
program. Nonetheless, we hope to spark a much‐needed research agenda around the CBI 
programs and their impact on real estate prices or investment. Additional empirical studies can 
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Table 1. Selected Citizenship by Investment Programs: A comparison 
Country (inception year) Property Investment Donation 
Saint Kitts and Nevis (1984) A minimum investment of USD 200,000 in a 
pre-approved property to be held for at least 7 
years (or USD 400,000 resalable after 5 
years). 
N/A One-off, non-refundable donation of USD 
150,000 to Sustainable Growth Fund  
(further fees for spouse and additional 
dependents) 
Commonwealth of Dominica 
(1993)  
Minimum USD 200,000 investment in CBI-
approved hotels and resorts to be held for at 
least five years 
N/A A donation of USD 100,000 to the 
Economic Diversification Fund (further 
fees for spouse and additional dependents) 
Bulgaria 2009 N/A Investment of at least 1 million Bulgarian 
Lev in government Eurobonds for the 
ordinary track (BGN 2 million under fast-
track option). 
N/A 
Cyprus (2011) Applicant must possess a permanent privately-
owned residence of which the purchase price 
must be at least EUR 500,000. 
and a minimum investment of EUR 1.5 
million in residential properties (or EUR 2 
million in commercial properties)  
A donation of EUR 100,000 to the 
Governments' Research and Development 
fund and EUR 100,000 to the Land 
Development Organization. 
Antigua and Barbuda (2013) Minimum USD 400,000 investment in a pre-
approved project to be held for five years. 
or a minimum investment of USD 1.5 
million or in a joint investment totaling USD 
5 million (each investor at least USD 
400,000). 
One-off, non-refundable donation of USD 
100,000 to National Development Fund 
(further fees for additional dependents) 
Grenada (2014) Minimum USD 350,000 investment in a pre-
approved property project to be held for at 
least 5 years 
N/A A donation of USD 150,000 to the 
National Transformation Fund (further 
fees for spouse and additional dependents) 
Malta (2014) Purchase a property for a minimum value of 
EUR 350,000 (or lease a property for a 
minimum annual rent of €16,000 to be held 
for at least 5 years 
and an investment of EUR 150,000 worth of 
stocks, bonds, debentures, special purpose 
vehicles to be held for at least 5 years 
A contribution of EUR 650,000 to the 
Maltese Government, which is deposited 
in the National Development and Social 
Fund. 
St Lucia (2016) Investment of at least USD 300,000 in an 
approved property project to be held for at 
least 5 years 
or investment of USD 3.5million in an 
approved business project. 
A donation of USD 100,000 to St Lucia 
National Economic Fund (further fees for 
spouse and additional dependents) 
Turkey (2017)  Minimum USD250,000 investment in a 
property to be held for at least three years 
or minimum capital investment of 
USD500,000; or USD 500,000 in a Turkish 
bank or government bonds (for at least three 
years)  
N/A 




Table 2. Estimation results of difference-in-differences model of real house prices 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 2.423 (2211.866)*** 2.337 (15.272)*** 2.010 (18.980)*** 
DiD 0.0202 (5.232)*** 0.0207 (5.495)*** 0.0202 (5.292)*** 
Real effective exchange rate 
 
0.0015 (1.165) 0.0031 (3.061)*** 
Real mortgage interest rate 
 
-0.3431 (-1.352) -0.164 (-1.014) 
Region fixed effects yes yes yes 
Combined time fixed effects yes yes 
 
Decoupled time fixed effects 
  
yes 
Adjusted R2 0.9821 0.0125 0.9746 
Numbers of observations 2343 2343 2343 
Note: *** and **refer to 1% and 5% significance levels respectively. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of real house prices. !"! is the multiplication of two dummy variables representing the 
treatment districts and the post-treatment period. Clustering standard errors are in the parentheses. The 
number of observations in the pre-treatment period is 680 while it is 544 in the post-treatment. All 

















































































































































Figure 2. The map of Istanbul: Visual representation of treatment and control districts 
 
Note: Green color refers to the treatment districts and blue color refers to the control districts. Treatment districts 
have a more than 5 percent ratio of foreign population to the total local population. Most of the control districts 
have less than 2 to 3 percent foreign percent population. The treatment and control groups are determined by the 
mean equality test based on data in 2018.  
 
